Articles Posted in Bankruptcy

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7th Circuit Court Seal

Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. v. Ind. Family & Soc.Servs. Admin.
7 Cir. Court of Appeals Case No.14-2420 Date August 28, 2015

Facts
Hospital had to pay a state-imposed Hospital Assessment Fee (HAF) as part of the new Indiana program to increase Medicaid reimbursements. After the Hospital failed to pay its HAF, the Indiana Family and Social Services Administration (FSSA) began withholding Medicaid reimbursements. This lead to cashflow problems at the Hospital, which filed for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy protection on June 19, 2012. On June 19, 2012 the Hospital filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. FSSA continued to withhold reimbursements in satisfaction of its HAF debt.

Procedural History
The Hospital filed an adversary complaint against FSSA claiming that the HAF was a pre-petition claim subject to the Automatic Stay. The Bankruptcy Court agreed, and ruled the HAF was an “act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case” per 11 U.S.C. 362(a)(6) that was subject to the stay. The Court ordered FSSA to repay the full amount it had withheld. The District Court reversed as to the HAF for fiscal year 2013.

Ruling
The 7th Circuit reversed, finding that the 2013 HAF, like the 2012 HAF, is a prepetition claim subject to the Automatic Stay. FSSA was aware of its claims against the Hospital—for both fiscal years 2012 and 2013—well before it filed for bankruptcy

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7th Circuit Court SealSchwartz v. Barclays Capital, Inc.
7th Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals
Docket 15-1416 Date: Aug 24, 2015

Facts
Schwartz was hired as an executive by Barclays Bank. As a perk, Barclays lent Schwartz $400,000 and promised to forgive the loan in 7 installments on the anniversary of his start date. Soon after that period started to run Schwartz was fired, making the unforgiven principal immediately due and payable. ‘

Schwartz refused to pay so the matter went to Arbitration. The Arbitrator sided with Barclays and ordered Schwartz to pay $568,568 which included Attorneys’ Fees and interest. Following the Arbitration decision Schwartz sought Chapter 7 protection.

Between the announcement of the award and the filing of Schwartz’s Petition, he and his wife spent thousands on non-essential consumer goods and services such as tickets to Disney World, private school tuition, and a monthly payment for a Range Rover. Barclays moved to dismiss the case.

Procedural History
The Bankruptcy Court dismissed Schwartz’ Chapter 7 Petition pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 707(a) “for cause.” Schwartz appealed to the District Court and, eventually, to the 7th Circuit – which Affirmed.

Opinion
The 7th Circuit found that the phrase “for cause” as used in the Bankruptcy Code embraces conduct that, even if not a violation of required procedures, avoids repayment of a debt without an adequate reason. In other words, the case was dismissed because the Schwartzes failed to pay as much of their indebtedness as they could.

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Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC, 14-109 (Jun 15) U.S. Sup.Ct.

Background

ASARCO hired the plaintiff law firms to assist it in carrying out its duties as a Chapter 11 Debtor in Possession (DiP) per 11 U.S.C. 327(a). When ASARCO emerged from Bankruptcy the law firms filed Fee Applications pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 330(a)(1), which permits the Bankruptcy Court to “award …reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services” by professionals.

Lower Court Rulings

ASARCO objected to the Fee Applications brought by its Attorneys. The Bankruptcy Court rejected ASARCO’s objections and went on to award fees for time spent defending the Fee Applications. On appeal from the Bankruptcy Court Order, The District Court held that the Law Firms could be awarded fees for defending their Fee Applications. On appeal from the District Court’s Order, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. Continue reading

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7th Circuit Court Seal

Carhart v. Carhart-Halaska Int’l, LLC 14-2968 (Jun 08)(7th Cir.)

Background

Federal Case

Carhart and Halaska own CHI. CHI terminated sales agent MRO. MRO filed a Federal suit for breach of contract. Carhart bought MRO’s Federal claim for $150,000 and became nominal Plaintiff. That lawsuit was actually against a company of which he was 1/2 owner.

State Case

Halaska sued Carhart in Wisconsin State Court, alleging that Carhart had breached his fiduciary duty by becoming the Plaintiff in the MRO Federal case, by writing checks against CHI accounts without approval, by depositing payments owed to CHI into Carhart’s account, and by withholding accounting and financial information.  The Wisconsin State Court appointed a Receiver, who informed the Federal court that CHI had no assets with which to pay a lawyer and consented to the entry of a $242,000 default judgment (the sum sought by Carhart), giving Carhart a profit of $92,000 on the purchase. Continue reading

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BoA v. Caulkett, 13–1421 (Jun 1) Supreme Court of the United States

Background

This case came to the Supreme Court due to a Circuit split on the issue of “Lien Stripping.” In this pair of cases the Debtors both filed Chapter 7 Bankruptcy cases, owned houses encumbered with senior mortgages and “underwater” junior mortgages held by the Petitioner banks. Because the amount owed on each senior mortgage was greater than each house’s current market value, the Banks would have received nothing if they foreclosed on the junior liens (i.e. underwater).

Debtors sought to void their junior mortgage liens under the terms of Bankruptcy Code §506, which provides that “To the extent that a lien secures a claim against the debtor that is not an allowed secured claim, such lien is void.” 11 USC §506(d). In each case, the Bankruptcy Court granted the Debtor’s respective motions, and both the District Court and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.

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United States Supreme Court, Docket: 14-116 Opinion Date: May 4, 2015

Appellant Bullard filed a Chapter 13 Bankruptcy case and proposed Plan. The Debtor’s mortgage lender objected to the treatment of its claim under the Plan and the Bankruptcy Court sustained that objection, denying confirmation of the Plan with leave to amend.

First Appeal

The Debtor appealed the denial of confirmation to the 1st Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, which concluded that denial of confirmation was not a final, appealable order under 28 U.S.C.158(a)(1). Nonetheless, the BAP heard the issue as an interlocutory appeal – the operative provision in the Bankruptcy Code requiring “with leave of the court.” Tha BAP agreed that Bullard’s proposed Plan did not accord proper treatment to the mortgage company and upheld the ruling of the Bankruptcy Court.

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Think you know about Lien Strips, the controversial practice featured in our post here? Well think again, because the law may be changing. Lucky for you we have an update ready to go.

WHAT IS A LIEN STRIP?

11 USC 1322(b) provides that wholly undersecured liens on real property may be removed or “stripped,” and the debt to which they relate treated as unsecured in a Chapter 13 Plan of Reorganization. Lien stripping has 2 distinct, and very desirable, benefits for debtors:

  1. The lien strip removes the junior lien from the property entirely; and
  1. The debtor only pays a percentage of the claim (as if it were an unsecured debt).

CAN A PARTIAL LIEN STRIP SUCCEED?

There is no such thing as a partial lien strip. Bankruptcy Courts will only allow a lien to be stripped if it is wholly undersecured (i.e. unsecured): that is, the secured potion is zero or negative. Moreover, lien stripping is permissible only for claims secured by the Debtor’s principle residence because a lien strip modifies the “total package of rights for which the claim holder bargained.”

QUALIFYING FOR A LIEN STRIP

For a lien to be stripped, the value of the debtor’s property as of filing, minus fully-secured non-target debts, must be = or < $0. Once upon a time meeting these requirements could be challenging; but today, when many homeowners are “underwater” as to their first mortgage and have a HELOC or 2nd mortgage on top of that, the conditions necessary for a lien strip to take place are relatively straightforward and can sometimes be met without much resistance from the affected creditor.

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On February 9, 2015 the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division ruled in the case of Brandt vs. Rohr-Alpha, a case involving fraudulent transfers and whether certain debts can be avoided in Bankruptcy.

What is a “Fraudulent Transfer?”

A pre-petition payment is avoidable as constructively fraudulent according to 548(a)(1)(B) when the Debtor:

  1. Transfers property or an interest in property;
  2. Within the 2 years preceding its bankruptcy;
  3. Got less than reasonably equivalent value; and
  4. Was insolvent or rendered insolvent as a result.

Reasonably Equivalent Value

To determine whether reasonably equivalent value was exchanged the Court must determine:

  1. Whether at time of transfer the Debtor received value; and, if so,
  2. Whether that value was equivalent to what the debtor gave up.

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For Debtors, Chapter 7 Liquidation is the ultimate relief, while Chapter 13 and 11 Reorganization offers an opportunity to reduce their Debtor’s payments in light of their income. In either type of case however, the Creditor is not entitled to anything until it has filed is Proof of Claim.

What Is a Proof of Claim?

The Proof of Claim or “PoC” is the means by which Creditors state:

  • How much they are owed by this Debtor;
  • Why they are owed that much to begin with; and
  • Whether debt is secured by property of the Estate.

Different types of cases contain strict deadlines for filing a PoC, and each PoC should be accompanied by supporting documentation such as a calculation of sums due, a copy of a Judgment Order, etc.

Will The Claim Be Paid?

Once filed, the Creditor’s PoC represents what could be paid to it, presuming:

  • The Debtor has sufficient assets to liquidate in order to pay the Creditor’s Claim; or
  • The Debtor’s Reorganization provides for full payment of creditors – a “100% Plan.

But in the overwhelming number of cases the reality is:

  • The Debtor has few if any assets to liquidate, resulting in a “No Asset” finding; or
  • The Debtor’s Plan of Reorganization involves paying only a small fraction of debts.

What If The PoC Is Wrong?

If a Debtor believes that a Creditor filed a materially false or inflated Claim, that Debtor may file an Objection to Proof of Claim. The Objection will require the Creditor to support, clarify, or defend its Claim. Creditors that fail to do so may lose their Claim altogether. As in the case of the PoC, there is a strict time limit in which to file Objections. Failure to do so is fatal to the Objection and permits the Creditor to pursue whatever amount it seeks.

The Upshot

For Creditors whose Debtors file Bankruptcy, the key to collecting is diligence and proactive planning. For Debtors whose Creditors continue to pursue them even past a Bankruptcy filing, it is critical to know what a Creditor can legitimately seek, what it cannot, once a Bankruptcy has been filed.

Your Turn

Want to share your thoughts on this post? Need to discuss your own situation? Call us in confidence at 630-378-2200 or reach us via e-mail at mhedayat[at]mha-law.com.

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Gasunas vs. Yotis, 14-321 (Nov.24) ND IL ED (J. Schmetterer)

The Facts

Yotis, a former Illinois Attorney, borrowed over $50,000 from his Client Gasunas using various tricks and subterfuge: from outright lies to misrepresentations and material omissions of fact designed to manipulate his “friend” and benefactor. Once he had the money, Yotis filed a Chapter 13 Bankruptcy.

The Adversary Complaint

Gasunas fought back against the Bankruptcy by filing a 4-count Adversary Complaint challenging Yotis’ Chapter 13 discharge under a variety of statutory fraud theories under 11 U.S.C. 523(a) including

  • Fraudulent Pretenses;
  • False Representations;
  • Actual Fraud; and
  • Fraud While a Fiduciary

Yotis, in turn, brought a Motion to Dismiss the Adversary Complaint sounding in 11 U.S.C. 12(b)(6) in an effort to have his case confirmed over the objections of his former Client.

The Opinion

In a carefully written and exhaustive Opinion, Judge Schmetterer of the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, evaluates each of the arguments in the Motion to Dismiss and applies them to all 4 counts of the Adversary Complaint. Ultimately the Court dismissed Counts I and II without prejudice and with leave to re-plead, while Counts III and IV are allowed to stand without any changes.

Aside from the precise way in which it examines everything from the Federal Rules of Civil and Bankruptcy Procedure to the substantive law of Bankruptcy Fraud and the Relation-Back Doctrine, the Opinion is notable for its recitation of the truly underhanded things that Yotis is alleged to have done in order to weasel money from his Client, including:

+ Crying about his wife and daughter leaving
+ Claiming to need money to pay his mortgage
+ Lying about visiting his sister in an institution
+ Cajoling even while professing false friendship
+ And many other examples of how not to behave

 The Upshot

This Opinion is a solid primer and review concerning the types of Bankruptcy Fraud available through 523(a) – a mainstay of Bankruptcy litigation. Here, the fact that the Debtor was an Attorney and the Plaintiff/Creditor was his former Client simply makes the case that much more of an object lesson.

Your Turn

Want to share your thoughts on this post? Need to discuss your own situation? Call us in confidence at 630-378-2200 or reach us via e-mail at mhedayat[at]mha-law.com.